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presence of 4-H there. Additionally, rural historians, scholars of gender 
and sexuality, and those examining the development of the modern 
American state will be among the many to find it absorbing.  
 
 
Herbert Hoover: A Life, by Glen Jeansonne. New York: New American 
Library, an imprint of Penguin Random House, 2016. viii, 454 pp. Essay 
on sources, notes, index. $28.00 hardcover. 
Herbert Hoover in the White House: The Ordeal of the Presidency, by Charles 
Rappleye. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016. xx, 555 pp. Illustra-
tions, notes, bibliography, index. $32.50 hardcover, $16.99 e-book. 
Reviewer Kendrick A. Clements is professor of history emeritus at the University 
of South Carolina. He is the author of Hoover, Conservation, and Consumerism: 
Engineering the Good Life (2000) and The Life of Herbert Hoover: Imperfect Visionary, 
1918–1928 (2010). 
Herbert Hoover’s name rarely arises in conversations about American 
presidents—unless the country is in economic trouble, when he is rou-
tinely cited as the president who mishandled the Great Depression. 
That charge infuriated him during his long post-presidency, and many 
of his biographers have shared his outrage. Even his defenders, how-
ever, have to admit that he was singularly inept in defending his poli-
cies to the American people while he was in the White House. Whether 
his actions were right or wrong, most Americans then and since got the 
impression that he didn’t care about the suffering of his fellow citizens. 
 Hoover began his career as a mining engineer, and most of his pub-
lic and private documents are dense with facts and figures—not easy 
reading. Although, as Glen Jeansonne points out, in later life Hoover 
worked hard to make his writings and speeches more “literary” and 
easier for general audiences to follow, much of his earlier work is pretty 
soporific. Digging through the mountains of material in the Herbert 
Hoover Presidential Library in West Branch, the Hoover Institution at 
Stanford, and elsewhere is a daunting task. The evidence illustrates 
Hoover’s enormous contribution to America and the world, but making 
the story accessible to modern readers is a challenge for any biographer. 
 Fortunately, identifying the central themes of complex issues and 
explaining them clearly and briefly are among Glen Jeansonne’s great 
strengths. Insofar as any account of Hoover’s career can be easy, pleas-
ant reading, Herbert Hoover: A Life is such a book. Its coverage of Hoo-
ver’s early life, in particular, reveals a warm human being very different 
from the iceberg who is the thirty-first president in most people’s minds. 
Tracing Hoover’s careers as a mining entrepreneur and pioneer in dis-
tant corners of the world, creator and manager of a relief program for 
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Europe and the Soviet Union during and after World War I, and an 
innovator in federal service to the nation through the Commerce De-
partment, Jeansonne makes a strong argument that “the kaleidoscopic 
range of his life would justify an inclusive biography even if he had 
never been president” (1–2). 
 In 1928 Hoover won a landslide election to the presidency as “the 
great humanitarian” and one of the principal architects of Republican 
prosperity during the 1920s. There seemed every reason to believe, as 
Hoover memorably declared at the close of his campaign, that America 
was “nearer to the final triumph over poverty than ever before in the 
history of any land.” But it was not to be; beginning with the stock mar-
ket crash in the autumn of 1929, the United States slid into a decade of 
the worst depression in its history. Hoover’s remarkable efforts to stop 
the collapse and lift the country back into prosperity are a central focus 
of both Jeansonne’s biography and Charles Rappleye’s Herbert Hoover 
in the White House: The Ordeal of the Presidency. 
 Drawing on his experience with relief in Europe, the management 
of the American Food Administration during the war, and flood relief 
in the Mississippi valley in 1927, Hoover believed at first that he could 
also fight the depression by mobilizing business volunteers, private 
charity, and local governments. Urging businesses to resist pressure to 
cut wages and jobs and asking local governments to accelerate public 
works programs, he did not at first believe that more direct federal in-
tervention would be necessary. His initial efforts had some success, but 
a cascade of bank failures and growing unemployment halted progress. 
By late 1930 he had to recognize that the voluntary approach alone 
would not bring recovery. 
 Late in 1931 Hoover asked Congress to create a Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation (RFC) with unprecedented authority to lend to en-
dangered banks and other large corporations. His theory was that if the 
banking system could be stabilized, credit would again become available 
to businesses, and the resulting surge in production and hiring would 
bring recovery. In combination with new efforts by the Federal Reserve 
to stimulate the economy, the RFC’s loans sharply slowed the rate of 
bank failures. The program was so successful that, according to Jean-
sonne, “the Depression had been stopped by the summer of 1932” (306).  
 Had voters been willing to stay the course with Hoover, Jeansonne 
argues, full recovery would have come fairly soon. Instead, “the uncer-
tainty of Roosevelt’s policies . . . spiked business fears” (305–6), and a 
major bank panic during the interregnum plunged the nation back into 
depression. The guiding motives of the New Deal, Jeansonne contends, 
were “patronage” and “political opportunism” (306), which delayed 
recovery and led to “the imposition of a leviathan government” (279). 
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For the remainder of his life Hoover contended that, if given time, his 
policies would have ended the depression, and Jeansonne insists that 
he offered “a more comprehensive exposition of enlightened, sophisti-
cated, humane conservatism than Ronald Reagan or Barry Goldwater” 
(301). During his presidency, however, Hoover’s inability to sell his pol-
icies to the American public meant that he received little credit for his 
efforts and became, in the public mind, a cold, uncaring Scrooge totally 
insensitive to his compatriots’ tribulations. 
 Rappleye’s Hoover is a more complex figure than Jeansonne’s “pub-
lic servant with a set of objectives he wanted to achieve” (289). As Rap-
pleye depicts him, Hoover was a pragmatic politician willing to play 
the race card in the South to win in 1928, and in office could be “surly, 
easily frustrated, and sometimes vindictive” (xvi).  
 If he is more willing to recognize Hoover’s flaws than Jeansonne, 
Rappleye also admires Hoover’s willingness to use the RFC and the 
Federal Reserve “to thaw frozen assets and open channels of credit by 
supporting banks and other private institutions with public funds” 
(xviii). As he digs into the details of the president’s policies, however, 
Rappleye discovers some things that Jeansonne doesn’t see. He argues 
that although the RFC was effective in slowing the flood of bank fail-
ures, it never achieved real recovery because “no matter how much 
money was sluiced into [the coffers of American banks], the bankers of 
America refused to push any back out the door” (364). Instead, they sat 
on their cash throughout 1932, leaving credit frozen while industrial 
production continued to decline and unemployment rose. 
 Nothing led to more criticism of Hoover than his refusal to support 
a major federal program for the unemployed. Part of the problem was 
that, as Rappleye points out, although Hoover had labored mightily as 
secretary of commerce to gather and disseminate statistics on the econ-
omy, the government still did not have accurate unemployment figures 
when the depression began. It was thus possible for officials to under-
estimate the problem, particularly because conventional economic wis-
dom held (even British economist John Maynard Keynes agreed as late 
as 1931) that private charity and local governments could and should 
be responsible for the unemployed. “Reliance on [the federal] govern-
ment,” the president and most professional economists believed, “bred 
bureaucracy and corruption, and stifled innovation” (233). Expansion 
of the federal bureaucracy through the creation of a “dole” was unnec-
essary in the short term and, more basically, would move the nation 
toward the sort of socialist policies that Hoover believed had under-
mined individual initiative and slowed economic progress in Europe. 
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 When the RFC failed to get industry restarted by the fall of 1932, 
unemployment and bank failures rose, while the government’s adop-
tion of what were seen as inflationary measures led foreign investors to 
fear that the United States would soon abandon the gold standard as 
Britain and other nations had done. Those, particularly the French, who 
had gold in American banks, began to make heavy withdrawals. Hoover, 
believing that maintenance of the gold standard would be essential to 
restore international trade, resisted the pressure for devaluation but could 
not stop the runs. Banks weakened by heavy withdrawals were crip-
pled, and a new surge of failures hit during the interregnum between 
the presidential election and Roosevelt’s inauguration in March 1933. 
Any confidence created by previous Hoover policies evaporated. Rap-
pleye doubts that the situation could have been stabilized, even if Roo-
sevelt had been willing to endorse Hoover’s policy during that period. 
 During his long post-presidency Hoover was obsessed with trying 
to persuade Americans that he would have handled the depression bet-
ter than Roosevelt if only he had been reelected in 1932. The Democrats, 
who read public opinion more accurately, were delighted to campaign 
as if Hoover were the candidate, no matter who the Republicans nomi-
nated in election after election. Hoover’s useful contributions to post-
war foreign policy and to governmental reorganization, Jeansonne 
notes, were lost in the noise. 
 Whether one argues, as Jeansonne does, that Hoover’s depression-
era policy was selfishly subverted by Democrats, or that uncontrollable 
circumstances, fatal flaws in the president’s personality, and rigidity in 
his ideology undermined his efforts, as Rappleye sees it, neither of these 
books is likely to reverse the popular image of the thirty-first president. 
Nevertheless, both are highly readable, and those who want to under-
stand the evolution of American policy toward management of the 
economy should read them.   
 
 
Presidential Libraries as Performance: Curating American Character from 
Herbert Hoover to George W. Bush, by Jodi Kanter. Theater in the Americas 
Series. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2016. xii, 179 pp. 
Table, illustrations, charts, notes, bibliography, index. $35.00 paperback. 
Reviewer Timothy Walch is the director emeritus of the Herbert Hoover Presi-
dential Library and a volunteer at the Iowa City Center of the State Historical 
Society of Iowa. 
The presidential library—rarely has a research and educational facility 
caused so much consternation within the academic community. Critics 
